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| By David Bedein May 1, 2007 |
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During the 34 days of that war, the Israeli Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretary conducted constant briefings with the media, in which Prime Minister Olmert's spokespeople repeated, over and over, the precise war aims of the Israeli government at the time:
1. The Israeli army prisoners, Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, kidnapped on July 12th, 2006, must be returned to Israel;
2. The Lebanese army must be the only force deployed in Southern Lebanon;
3. The Hezbollah must be expelled from Southern Lebanon as per UN Resolution 1559.
Yet on August 15th, 2006, after Israel pushed for and accepted a cease fire without any of these conditions being fulfilled, Prime Minister Olmert's spokesman conducted a press briefing to announce that the war aims had been achieved as soon as the UN cease fire resolution 1701 had been approved by the UN Security Council. This reporter then asked a simple question: How could he contradict the previous statement of Israel's war aims? No answer was forthcoming.
The August 2006 statements from Olmert's government that Israel had achieved its stated war aims by accepting a ceasefire that left Hezbollah in place and which did not lead to the return of the hostages sparked mass street demonstrations, led by the families of fallen Israeli soldiers and families of Israeli reservists who had been called up for service during the war of summer 2006. The demands of these demonstrations were for an official independent investigation of how the war was conducted and for the resignation of the Israeli government and military leadership.
Olmert agreed to a commission of inquiry -- however, not an independent commission of inquiry. Olmert appointed the commission, whose mandate was to investigate every aspect of decision making in the war, yet without a mandate to recommend that any Israeli government official or Israeli military official be fired.
The expectation was that Olmert's hand-picked panel would criticize the government and the army, without mentioning Israeli government and military leaders by name.
Therefore, the Olmert government and the public at large in Israel were taken by surprise by the intense personal tone of Olmert's own commission of investigation.
"We determine that there are very serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We impose the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they were made...
"We determine that there are very serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We impose the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of Defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a
decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they were made. However,, there are many others who share responsibility for the mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions...
"The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena..."
And the conclusions of the commission were clear and unambiguous:
"The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stemmed from his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions which were taken.
"The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.
"The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious discussion of the relationships between these goals and the authorized modes of military action. He made a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible."
The Minister of Defense did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he attended.
"The Minister of Defense did not act within a strategic conception of the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF; and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table -- and did not demand presentation -- of serious strategic options for discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.
"The Minister of Defense failed in fulfilling his functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defense during the war impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.
"Members of the IDF's general staff who were familiar with the assessments and intelligence concerning the Lebanon front, and the serious deficiencies in preparedness and training, did not insist that these should be considered within the army."
Bar Ilan University Prof. Ephraim Inbar, one of Israel's experts in strategic warfare, went a step further, writing that "by denying the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) victory, they squandered an opportunity to destroy the bulk of Hezbollah's military presence in southern Lebanon, settle regional scores, enhance Israel's deterrence, and strengthen Jerusalem's alliance with Washington. Inbar went on to say that "Israel's intelligence organs had neglected to collect intelligence regarding Hezbollah's short range Katyushas. And that Israeli Military officials had considered such rockets as weapons of little consequence because of their inaccuracy and small warheads...The war showed Israel's northern population to be ill-prepared to withstand a large rocket barrage. Most of the short-range Katyushas fell in empty fields and caused little damage, but 25 percent of the nearly 4,000 missiles launched hit urban areas and paralyzed the whole of northern Israel, its main port, refineries, and many other strategic installations. Over one million Israelis lived in bomb shelters and about 300,000 temporarily left their homes and sought refuge in the south."
Inbar also questioned why Israel did not strike Syrian targets to signal Israel's determination to deal with terrorist and proxy threats, enhancing Israeli deterrence.
Even though Israeli Chief of Staff Dan Halutz resigned in disgrace in anticipation of the personal conclusions of Olmert's war investigation commission, Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister Peretz each announced that, in the wake of the commission's conclusion, neither disgraced Israeli public official would resign.
Why? Because the commission did not explicitly demand their respective dismissals. Instead, the spokespeople of Olmert and Peretz issued a barrage of statements to the media that they would follow through on the commission's recommendations for improvement in communication and coordination between the Israeli army, Israeli intelligence and the Israeli government. They would clean up their own messes.
Israel's leading investigative journalist, Yoav Yitzhak, revealed an internal strategic memo issued, apparently at Kadima party head Olmert's directive, to all 29 faction members in the Knesset, instructing them to blame the Israel Defense Forces for the failure, not Israel's political leadership.
The Israeli reservists and families of the 118 Israeli soldiers killed in last summer's conflict will spearhead mass demonstrations to demand that the government resign as a result of the war commission's findings.
These planned demos will not reflect a fringe element in Israeli public opinion. Polls taken after Olmert's war commission findings were published show that 65% of the Israeli population demands that the Israeli government resign as a result of the findings
of Olmert's hand picked commission of inquiry into the summer 2006 war in Lebanon. Polls taken yesterday show that Olmert's public support hovers between 0% and 1.5%.
David Bedein is a veteran investigative journalist and Chief Editor of the Israel Resource News Agency. |
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