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Olmert and Peretz confide, in better days (file)
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| By israelinsider staff May 10, 2007 |
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Following weeks of controversy concerning their release, the testimonies of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and former IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz before the Winograd Commission were posted online Thursday morning, following the publication of the partial report. Sensitive security and diplomatic comments were censored.
However, the public transcript confirmed the impression of unpreparedness, indecisiveness and ineptitude of Israel's top leadership following the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers last July.
Olmert testified that Halutz had assured him in meetings at the start of the war that the army was ready. "[He told me] we had a qualified, strong army at our service," the Prime Minister said, adding that the former Chief of Staff had said that Israel could achieve all its goals, and wouldn't even need to call up additional battalions for a ground operation. But it turned out otherwise.
Olmert: IDF "seriously let itself down"
Olmert whined about his confusion and feelings of being overwhelmed upon taking the reigns of power following the hospitalization of former prime minister Ariel Sharon.
"Amidst all the drama that came along with it, the turmoil, the political upheaval ... - you have to take charge of things, there are elections in two and a half months, and you are heading a party, and you have to establish a party, and it's not clear, will he return, will he not return, will he get better, will he not get better??
Olmert said in his testimony said that he decided to launch war after seeing how the "Lebanse quagmire was closing in on us". He cited a Biblical quote to justify his belief that the greatest danger came from Lebanon. "In all the commotion I was constantly dealing with one subject -- the North. The other commands were also raging ... and I said, take me to the Northern Command, because I felt that out of the North, the threat shall break forth.?
The prime minister said that "we knew in advance that they (Hezbollah) would bomb our home-front targets and we could make only one decision -- either we do not act at all or we act straight away. I think we had no other choice but to act immediately."
Olmert admitted that one option would have been to wait, "Yes, there was another option, but this was preferable. As far as international support, it could not have waited."
Olmert blamed the military, saying, "I think the army seriously let itself down", but he distinguished between the soldiers, who were "outstanding", and the commanders, who were not. It wasn't an issue of courage, he said. There was "something in the conception of activating the forces, something in the conception of commanding the forces, something was not what we expected it to be," he continued. "There is no doubt that it caused a disparity between our ability to achieve and what we actually achieved."
Olmert also faulted the army for operational failures at the outset of the war: "If the initial operations had been carried out properly, a ground assault would have been avoided."
Still, Olmert admitted that it was the political echelon, not the military, that failed to see "the big picture."
"I told the chief of staff several times and I also told other commanders -- they don't see the entire picture," said Olmert. "They can't see the entire picture and they don't need to see the entire picture. That isn't their job. Their job is to carry out their mission in the best, most effective way, that is cheapest in terms of the human cost, and in the best way for Israel."
"The comprehensive picture of all the aspects, all the complexities, of relationships and sensitivities -- all those things, are the responsibility of [the political] echelon," he added.
The prime minister added that the bombing in Kfar Qana, in which dozens of civilians were unintentionally killed, was a turning point, preventing accomplishment of the military goals. "The fact is, if Qana hadn't happened, there is good reason to believe that we would have been in a very good position to complete the process."
Halutz: 'Nothing was accomplished'
In his testimony, defense minister Peretz said that he went into the war confident of the military's ability.
"On July 12 (the first day of the war), I was not presented with a situation that the army had not trained enough or that there was any problem with the army's preparedness," Peretz said. He estimated that "the whole campaign would last 10-14 days."
"I assumed that the international community would not give us any longer than that, although I thought that the longer we give our forces to operate, the more we will weaken Hizbullah," said the defense minister.
Former chief of staff Halutz agreed that "33 days was longer than it should have been. Definitely." He added that "the fact that nothing was accomplished was the most evident failure."
Halutz also indirectly criticized Peretz and the political trend he represented. The former IDF chief said that "the IDF has turned into a kind of national punching-bag, and it has become more and more popular to beat it." He lamented that "What once was strong in Israel -- the defense lobby -- has been replaced by the social lobby," he added. "The backing that was given to the military has dwindled on a basic level."
Though Halutz said his cooperation with Peretz was businesslike, "I found a minister who was less attentive to our problems."
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