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This image, made available by the Israeli Government Press Office archive, shows former Israeli deputy PM Yigael Allon, seen from the back, welcomes hijacked Air France passengers coming on the Hercules plane at the Ben Gurion Airport in Israel July 4, 1976. (AP)
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| By Associated Press July 5, 2006 |
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As Israel marked the 30th anniversary of its dramatic rescue of dozens of hostages at Uganda's international airport, the army faced a similar dilemma: A soldier kidnapped by Palestinian militants was captive somewhere in the crowded Gaza Strip.
But the key elements that made the 1976 Entebbe operation one of Israel's greatest successes -- good intelligence and mistakes by the hijackers -- appear to be missing this time around, complicating efforts to bring Cpl. Gilad Shalit, kidnapped by Hamas militants last week, home safely.
The timing brought back memories to a seemingly lost era of successful, daring Israeli military operations.
"The Entebbe anniversary shows the seriousness with which we attach to freeing our hostages," said Mark Regev, spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry. "I think people holding Israeli hostages today should understand that we will do everything we can to bring about the liberation of hostages and, of course, punish those involved in hostage taking."
On July 4, 1976, Israeli commandos and paratroopers carried out a hastily planned military operation in 99 minutes, whisking more than 100 hostages out of a terminal at Uganda's international airport and into waiting Hercules military jets for an uncomfortable but joyful ride to safety.
The complex operation's success made headlines worldwide, bringing the Israeli army glory and overshadowing U.S. bicentennial celebrations.
The crisis began on June 27, when it became clear a Paris-bound Air France flight from Tel Aviv had been hijacked by militants from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine after a stopover in Athens. Following a brief refueling in Libya, the plane continued to its final destination, Uganda.
"Then the terrorists made a big mistake. They separated the Israelis and the non-Jews and sent a first group to Paris," recalled Mookie Betzer, the architect of the rescue operation.
Mossad agents paid clandestine visits to the released hostages, hitting the jackpot with a French-Jewish man who was mistakenly released, Betzer told Ynet, a Web site affiliated with the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot.
The man, a former officer in the French army, was a "serious guy with a phenomenal memory" who supplied information about the hijackers, their positions and their weaponry, Betzer said.
At about the same time, it also became clear that Uganda's dictator, Idi Amin, was working with the hijackers.
Then-Defense Minister Shimon Peres, interviewing Israeli military officials who had worked closely with Amin, rapidly put together a psychological profile of the dictator who obsessed about winning a Nobel Peace Prize and believed his mother had come to him in a dream warning him against harming the Jews.
While Betzer pieced together the rescue operation, other officials bought time by catering to Amin's ego in negotiations, telling him if he made sure the captors were safe he would become a Nobel laureate.
Meanwhile, the government approved Betzer's operation, which included flying a Mercedes, several Land Rovers and dozens of paratroopers to Uganda to free the hostages.
Their chances of success were slim, but they had access to the airport's blueprints -- provided by the Israeli construction company that had built the terminals -- information about the hijackers from the released hostages and aerial photos taken by a Mossad agent just a few hours before the operation was launched, Betzer said.
The only blemish on the almost mythological raid was the death of its commander, Lt. Col. Jonathan (Yoni) Netanyahu, the older brother of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who became an Israeli icon.
Today, Israeli officials say they don't know where the soldier is being held, making it impossible to carry out a rescue operation. The hijackers also have avoided mistakes by releasing no information about the soldier.
Still, Eran Lehrman, a former Israeli intelligence official, pointed out that ahead of Entebbe the military and political echelons repeatedly said an army operation was impossible.
"No two cases are the same in situations like this," Lehrman said. "Everything depends first and foremost on the quality of the intelligence you have and the operational environment. Intelligence sometimes evolves over time. Missing pieces are provided by various sources. The intelligence could be very different from today to tomorrow."
This time, Israel also has to consider diplomatic efforts by Egypt. A military operation would risk humiliating Egypt, an Arab country of key importance to Israel, he said.
Today the military also is operating under the weight of a failed attempt in 1994 to release an Israeli soldier, Nachshon Wachsman, from his Palestinian captors. Wachsman was killed along with one of the commandos who came to rescue him.
"The Israeli army is making no secret of the difficulties involved," Lehrman said. "There's no lack of awareness or any blase attitude ... on behalf of the army."
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