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Mark Silverberg is the author of "The Quartermasters of Terror: Saudi Arabia and the Global Islamic Jihad" (Wyndham Hall Press, 2005), a listed author with the Ariel Center for Policy Research, a featured writer for the New Media Journal (Chicago), and a regular contributor to Arutz Sheva, Midstream and Outpost Magazines on American foreign policy in the Middle East.
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By Mark Silverberg
November 13, 2007
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How's this for an Israeli position at Annapolis:
"Tell you what, if you recognize Israel as a sovereign state in the Middle East, prove you are dismantling your terrorist infrastructures, stop sending your suicide bombers into our cities, towns and marketplaces, stop inciting hatred and spreading blood libels through your media, your mosques, your educational system and throughout your society, stop brainwashing your children into believing that the fast track to virgins in Paradise requires them to become human grenades, and stop firing missiles at us, we'll come to the table with a settlement offer that will bring both our societies peace and prosperity."
Sound reasonable? Absolutely. Is that going to happen any time soon? Not until a new breed of Arab leadership arises.
Truth is, an Israeli-Palestinian peace is not on anyone's agenda at Annapolis, and that's why Annapolis represents a grave threat to Israel. The real American motive for the Conference is to solidify America's anti-Shiite alliance against Iranian expansionism, stabilize Iraq, shore up Arab support for a pending coalition air-strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, and secure American oil interests in the Middle East. And in this game of high-stakes political poker, despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, Israel's national security interests are of secondary importance.
In the world of realpolitik, Israel is viewed by Foggy Bottom as more of a bargaining chip than a strategic asset so the guiding philosophy there is that all disputes and world problems can be resolved through negotiations even if, as in this case, only one side is being asked to make any real concessions. With the U.S. experiment in Middle East nation-building something less than a resounding success, other priorities have taken precedence. Simply stated, if the Saudis and Syrians show up at Annapolis, pressure will be applied on Israel to make significant one-sided concessions for getting them there. For Syria, that means Israel will be forced to make dangerous concessions on the Golan Heights and America will use its good offices to stop investigations into Syria's role in the assassinations of Rafik Hariri and other anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon. For the Saudis, it means continued American protection, killing the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2007* before it passes out of the Committee stage, and continuing American blindness to the Saudi's global propagation of Wahhabism/Salafism.
Even though the U.S. knows that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is a weak leader heading a corrupt, incompetent organization that has failed to comply with one single pre-condition laid down in the Roadmap (most notably that relating to the dismantling the Palestinian terror infrastructures) and even though it is common knowledge that Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad lack control over Gaza, have little loyalty within or control over their own Fatah militias on the West Bank, and can never be credible interlocutors for peace, further concessions will be demanded of Israel if Annapolis unfolds as Secretary Rice desires. That means Israel will be forced to release more terrorists and surrender even more vital territory to hostile neighbors in return for more empty Arab promises. Abbas like Arafat (to paraphrase an Abba Eban quote), ''can't reach a bridge without double-crossing it.''
Nevertheless, given American pressure on the Olmert government to "take risks for peace" and make "painful compromises", there is cause for genuine Israeli concern since the current Palestinian leadership has never had any intention of preparing its people either for peace or for co-existence with Israel. One need only look at Hamas and Palestinian Authority-published textbooks showing maps of Palestine as encompassing present-day Israel, public statements (in Arabic), incitement in the media, and the toleration and encouragement of terrorist attacks to understand that there is no common ground here. As Melanie Phillips wrote recently in the Spectator:
"This is not, as (the U.S.) implies, a fight between two parties equally responsible for a terrible conflict. It is a war to exterminate the Jewish state that is being waged by Arabs and Islamists with differing strategies and agendas on the same continuum of annihilation - and with not one single credible interlocutor on their side who genuinely wants to live in peace with Israel."
For all the above reasons, Israel is continually being forced to make concessions such as providing food, power and water supplies to its enemies in Hamas-controlled Gaza and is continually being told by Secretary Rice to treat the secular terrorists of Fatah as "partners in peace" even though that organization has not made one single effort to dismantle its terrorist infrastructures.
The unfortunate truth is that Israel's "goodwill gestures" such as releasing terrorists, abandoning checkpoints, supplying services that should be provided by the PA itself, and releasing funds are all interpreted as signs of weakness by her enemies (including Mahmoud Abbas) who have always understood that any recognition of Israel's right to exist in the Middle East under any circumstances would constitute a death sentence. Anwar Sadat is the poster child for any Arab leader who places the welfare of his own nation above the so-called "sanctity of the Muslim umma." It is that very reason why in 2000, Yasser Arafat could not bring himself to accept a Palestinian state on 98% of the West Bank with Arab Jerusalem as its capital and why Israel can never offer the current leadership of the Arab world anything short of its own extinction.
Nevertheless, the Palestinians are threatening that if there is no real, significant, tangible outcome from the Annapolis Conference (meaning more Israeli concessions), the result will be another uncontrolled and uncontrollable Intifada and it will be entirely "Israel's fault." It is up to Israel, in short, to cede to Palestinian demands and it is up to the United States to see that Israel does so. Thus, Annapolis could represent a profound calamity for Israel as the Arabs will expect everything in return for conceding nothing. Forcing Israel to make further Gaza-like "goodwill gestures" on the West Bank and the Golan Heights will have the same effect as throwing red meat to a hungry lion? It will only whet their appetite for more at a time when there is simply no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. The record of Palestinian non-compliance with the Roadmap for Peace and their failure to stop missiles from being fired into Israel's populated areas says something of true Palestinian intentions, yet there is no end to U.S. pressure on the Israelis to bring down their West Bank check-points, create a corridor connecting Gaza to the West Bank, stop construction of its defensive barrier (that has proven to be successful against suicide bombers,) accept another terrorist statelet on the West Bank or negotiate a return of the Golan to an enemy that is actively facilitating the death of Americans in Iraq and the demise of what's left of Lebanese sovereignty. So what could possibly be the value of Mahmoud Abbas's signature on anything coming out of Annapolis except to further America's other global interests at Israel's expense?
Based on the Gaza experience, Israelis believe that they have fought, negotiated and unilaterally withdrawn for nothing - and they are not wrong in this - so Annapolis promises further pressure on Israel to make more dangerous concessions as the price to be paid for other U.S. global concerns. Despite crossing so many "red lines" in the past, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Israel is being told privately by Secretary Rice to gamble once again with its national security - this time on the West Bank and the Golan Heights. It is frightening to imagine the possibility of Israel abandoning its bedrock security interests in order to accommodate the Secretary's dangerous pursuit of final agreements on borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, and limitations on Israeli forces on the West Bank given that the Palestinians themselves have been either unwilling or unable to implement sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at dismantling their own terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. As Morris Amitay wrote recently: "No matter how desperately she will seek to achieve progress, there is just too large a gap between Israel's desire for a real peace and the Palestinians' desire for the end of Israel." Sadly, this conflict is not even close to resolution. As a consequence, forcing further unilateral concessions from Israel would be a recipe for disaster. Israel must never again place hope over experience.
*The recently submitted Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2007 calls for Saudi Arabia to permanently close all schools, charities and other organizations within Saudi Arabia that fund, train, incite, encourage, aid or abet terrorists anywhere in the world, including providing support for families of individuals who support terrorism. It also calls for the termination of all Saudi aid and assistance to overseas organizations that fund, train, incite, encourage, aid or abet terrorism; the blocking of all such support by private Saudi organizations and individuals; and complete, unrestricted and unobstructed Saudi cooperation with the U.S. in combating terror.
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