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Sean Gannon is a freelance writer and researcher on Irish and Israeli affairs, specialising in the relationship between the two countries. He is currently preparing a book on this subject and writing the chapter on Ireland for a forthcoming study on the interplay between Anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism and antisemitism in Europe since 9/11.
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By Sean Gannon
August 22, 2003
While the Jerusalem government may have been angered by Nabil Sha'ath's recent statement that the Roadmap guarantees a Palestinian right of return to pre-1967 Israel, it cannot have been very surprised. In fact, one of its foremost objections to the Quartet's peace plan was that, in citing the Saudi Arabian initiative as a source of authority, it left the way open to this kind of argument. For Crown Prince Abdullah's March 2002 proposal demanded not only "a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem," but specified that it should be "agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194." And this Israel has consistently rejected for 55 years, fearing that to accept it as even a basis for discussion risked conceding a 'right of return.'
Of course, given the non-binding nature of Assembly resolutions, Israel has been perfectly entitled to adopt a policy of non-compliance with what amount to Resolution 194's non-mandatory recommendations, but if controversies like that currently raging are to be avoided in the future, there must come a change in this strategy. It is now time for Jerusalem to reassess past policy and separate a valuable practical resolution from the dangerous ideological principle with which it has been forever entangled; time to recognize that, contrary to Israel's long-held belief, Resolution 194 embodies, not the 'right of return,' but a workable alternative to it.
For, notwithstanding the claims of the Palestinians, Resolution 194 does not actually contain a 'right of return.' Their contention that its language on the issue is "clear and exacting" is belied by the fact the operative section makes no mention whatsoever of rights, entitlements or prerogatives. On the contrary, its wording is distinctly hortatory; the text merely states that the refugees "should be permitted" to return to their homes at the "earliest practicable date." And even this recommendation is made conditional; it applies, not to all of the refugees, but only to those "wishing to... live at peace with their neighbors" a figure which, incidentally, Dr. Khalil Shikaki's recent survey puts at only 20%. This is hardly the language of 'rights,' a fact acknowledged by the Arabs in 1948 when they denounced the resolution's terminology as incompatible with the idea of a 'right' to repatriation. It was, in fact, on these grounds that they voted against it at the time and that the Palestinians themselves refused to endorse it for a further forty years. Thus, if Resolution 194 constitutes, in Wadie Said's words, the Palestinians' "strongest claim under international law for their inalienable right of repatriation," then it is clear they have no such right at all.
But when unburdened of such ideological baggage, Resolution 194 is revealed as a reasonable and realistic blueprint for the resolving of the refugee issue. It speaks of 'return,' not as the sole or even the principal solution to the problem, but rather as just one of a number of options such as restitution, rehabilitation and resettlement, all of which Israel has long recognized constitute the way forward on the issue even as it repudiated the UN resolution which proposed them. It was this which led to the rather incongruous situation whereby both Oslo agreements studiously avoided mention of Resolution 194 while, at the same time, its core recommendations formed the basis for negotiations on the refugees held under their auspices, from the Beilin-Abu Mazen discussions in 1995 to the Taba talks of 2001.
The problem was, of course, that Resolution 194's mere mention of 'return' rendered it unacceptable to Israel as a framework solution. But the fact is that the terms of any solution to the problem, however favorable to Israel, will require the admission of a certain number of the refugees. But these will not be "permitted to return" on the basis of any mythical 'right,' but under the auspices of family reunification or some other humanitarian program. In fact, there has already been some agreement between the sides on the principle of this matter although the percentages involved have been fiercely disputed.
The 40,000 suggested by the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, during his May 25th meeting with Silvan Shalom seems a reasonable figure but even one twice that size should not alarm Israel unduly; for the estimated 140,000 Palestinians assimilated under the recently annulled Oslo-era reunification scheme have not had any appreciable impact on the nation's demographic patterns. In any case, Israel will have the final say on any final figure which must, in Bill Clinton's words, be "consistent with Israel's sovereign decision."
Not that Resolution 194 places the burden of implementing a solution to the problem exclusively on Israel's shoulders. On the contrary, Jerusalem's abiding refusal to accept legal or moral responsibility for the refugees is supported by the resolution, which neither blames Israel for creating the problem nor charges it with responsibility for solving it.
Of course, the Palestinians will continue to insist that this is not the case that, contrary to the facts, Resolution 194 is the legal embodiment of their sacred 'right of return.' Indeed, this point was reiterated just last weekend at a "No Alternative to Right of Return Conference" in Ramallah by the PLO Department of Refugees. But Israel must no longer allow such claims to prevent it endorsing the resolution's recommendations, just as it has not allowed the Arab interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 to prevent its successful embracement as a blueprint for peace.
For Israel has nothing to fear from Resolution 194; only Jerusalem's 55-year refusal to accept it has made it appear that it has. For the resolution's continued rejection is interpreted by the Arabs as an implicit Israeli acknowledgement that it incorporates a 'right of return.' Its acceptance now by Israel will serve only to further underline that no such right exists.
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