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David Frankfurter brought his family to Ra'anana, Israel from their native Sydney, Australia in 1992. He is a business consultant, corporate executive and writer who frequently comments on the Middle East conflict.
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By David Frankfurter
November 6, 2003
Were it not for terrorism, Israel would not be building a security fence. In March 2002, twelve successful suicide bombings left 80 people dead and over 500 wounded. Israeli military actions have reduced the threat but not eradicated the terrorist organizations. However the attacks continue to take a horrific toll; hundreds have been launched from Palestinian territories in the past three years.
The military consideration
The contours of the fence have been determined primarily by military considerations, as has its structure. The barrier will be patrolled and maintained on both sides by Israel's military, in conjunction with the army's operations in the West Bank. To protect Israelis living close to the Green Line as well as those living in settlements, it is being built for the most part inside the West Bank. The security fence is therefore expected to effectively hamper terrorist movement, just as fences have prevented infiltrations along the borders with Lebanon and with Gaza.
Experience has nevertheless shown that even after such a barrier is completed, military actions may remain necessary. Fences have not completely eliminated episodes of bullets shot or missiles fired across the border from Gaza or Lebanon. But, as any country would accept, such a situation would be intolerable in proximity to the country's center.
Is the fence permanent?
For the record, this fence is not considered permanent. This fence is not a replacement for a border but an adjunct to the security measures in place. It should not be forgotten that Israel has ample experience moving fences; in 2000, the fence on the Lebanese border was moved three times to comply with UN boundary demands.
Despite the purposes of the fence, its opponents see the layout of the fence in a different light, claiming that Israel is exploiting the security issue to annex Palestinian land and that the distress the fence causes Palestinians far outweighs Israel's security considerations. To counter these criticisms, Israel's government has reiterated that the fence is not a political border and that it still hopes to achieve peace with the Palestinians through negotiation and compromise.
Many consider the cost of the fence as evidence that Israel intends the barrier to be permanent. Yet, consider this: In the course of peace negotiations, Israel has frequently mentioned that it is ready to make some hard decisions in the name of peace. Specific proposals were even offered at Camp David in 2000, but rejected by the Palestinian leadership. The Israeli Prime minister reiterated such comments throughout the discussions on the Roadmap in 2003, but his offer was only met with more Palestinian violence.
The hardships that the fence causes Palestinians must also be viewed within the context of the conflict. The impact of the fence palls in comparison to the impact of the Israeli military presence. By improving the army's ability to hinder terrorist movement, the security fence will reduce the intensity of the measures taken against the general Palestinian population.
Summary
The Oslo Accords of 1993 gave the Palestinian Authority the opportunity to prove that it could be a responsible neighbor, one with whom Israel could share a common border. Terrorism is the major hindrance to meeting these expectations. Until a political solution is achieved, Israel cannot leave its citizens, wherever they are found, to the mercy of terrorists.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
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