Despite opposition across a broad spectrum of Israeli society, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has decided that Israeli forces and civilians should be unilaterally withdrawn from the Gaza region. The decision has been made without broad consultation, and seemingly without consideration of the issues involved.

The rationale behind Sharon's move is that in leaving Gaza, points of friction between Jewish civilians (the 'settlers'), Israeli security forces and the local Arab population will be minimized, thus creating a more relaxed, tolerant and peaceful environment.

In order not to hand the terrorist movements in Gaza a clear victory, Sharon is engaging in a substantial military assault on Islamic terrorist movements operating within the Gaza Strip, culminating in the March 22, 2004 elimination of Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin. Sharon's aim is to smash the terrorist infrastructure, disarm the terrorists, bequeath control to an entity (the Egyptians have been touted as a possibility) and allow Israel, the European Union and United States to pour reconstruction aid into the Gaza economy to allow the Palestinian Arabs a viable economy with which to busy themselves.

Once this is achieved, the Israeli army will be able to escort the Israeli civilians to new locations in Israel or in Judea & Samaria.

It all sounds wonderful, but it also sounds familiar.

Within the last decade, Israel has made to two significant withdrawals: from major Arab population centers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza (1993-1997), and from southern Lebanon (May 2000). Under both withdrawals, the government of the day sold the idea by saying that the vacated territory would be:

Occupied by responsible authorities (the Palestinian Authority and the Lebanese government);

That these responsible authorities would disarm terrorist groups and assume security control over the territories; and

That in the event of non-compliance, or of terrorist attacks on Israel, the international community would support Israel's fully legal actions of self-defense, even if it meant territorial incursions.

And what has actually come to pass?

The 'responsible authorities' have, in the case of the Lebanese government, not assumed control of the vacated territory to prevent cross-border incidents, and in the case of the Palestinian Authority, the 'responsible authority' quickly transformed itself into a terrorist entity.

Far from disarming terrorists, the Lebanese government has tolerated Hizbullah control of the south, while the Palestinian Authority has not only allowed Islamic Jihad and Hamas effective free reign, they have created additional terrorist organizations which often cooperate with the other two.

Despite clear and unambiguous evidence of the aggressive nature of both Hizbullah and the Palestinian terrorist offensive, the 'international community' has steadfastly refused to condemn terrorism and is strident and shameless in its condemnation of Israel for defending itself.

With this bitter lesson in international relations still afflicting us on a daily basis, there are many reasons as to why a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza seems like perhaps the worst idea at the worst possible time, leading to a similar security and diplomatic catastrophe.

Firstly, a hasty unilateral withdrawal, looks, feels and smells like a defeat. As with Israel's retreat from southern Lebanon, the impression is that Israel is weak, and that enough sustained terrorism will eventually force Israel to make concessions with no reciprocal requirements from the other side. Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon was made without extracting a single concession from Hizbullah, which was free to rearm (which it has), redeploy (which it did) and menace Israel with the threat of 10,000 long-range Katyusha rockets (which it does).

A unilateral withdrawal from Gaza would simply replicate the conditions of both the 1993 and 2000 withdrawal. Israeli withdrawal would be followed by Hamas/Islamic Jihad claims of victory, rearming via Egyptian smuggling routes, and an invigoration of the effort to 'liberate' the rest of 'Palestine'.

Secondly, a withdrawal from Gaza would eliminate Israel's border controls on the Strip. With Israeli forces gone from southern Lebanon, Hizbullah has been free to import sophisticated weaponry from Iran and Syria. As a result, 10,000 missiles and hundreds of fighters are arrayed on Israel's northern border, often meters from civilian towns, hamstringing Israel's ability to operate against the threat due to Hizbullah's ability to unleash its arsenal.

Even with Israeli forces currently in Gaza, the Sinai smuggling routes and marine efforts of the Palestinians to import weapons constitute a serious threat to Israel. With Israeli forces gone, the inflow of materiel to Gaza would be unchecked and unparalleled. Israel would soon find itself facing a terrorist state armed with the latest weaponry and eager to confront Israeli civilians and security forces (probably in that order).

Thirdly, the terrorist groups cannot be entirely destroyed, especially not in Muslim Arab societies as obsessed with Jew-hatred and Jew-killing as that found in Gaza. Even if the entire membership of Hamas or Islamic Jihad were eliminated tomorrow, new members would be attracted to the cause of killing Jews. By remaining within the Gaza Strip, Israeli forces can keep the terrorists checked, restrict their operations, and operate pre-emptively as required. The loss of this freedom of operation will mean that each Israeli operation into 'Palestine' - as in Oslo days - would require significant political capital, and would elicit worldwide condemnation. Israel's de facto re-assumption of security control over the Gaza Strip since 2001 is now a grudgingly accepted fact in international circles, and changing the status quo would only be to Israel's disadvantage.

Fourthly, the terrorist groups cannot be entirely disarmed. Even with Israeli security control, weapons are smuggled into Gaza from Sinai and by sea. Once Israeli forces have left Gaza, it is ludicrous to think that Egyptian and/or Palestinian forces, which have thus far done absolutely nothing to stem the flow of weaponry, would have any inclination or success in doing so in the future.

Finally, the outsourcing or subcontracting of Israeli security has proven a dismal and costly failure. By leaving local or, worse still, Egyptian authorities in control of Gaza, Israel is once again banking on the failed formula that Arab administrations would ensure Israel's security. Given that this policy has failed spectacularly in Gaza (1993-2000) and southern Lebanon (since 2000), it is asinine to suggest using this tried, tested and failed strategy, again.

The evidence against a Gaza withdrawal is overwhelming, especially since it has already been attempted within the last decade. For a military strategist as brilliant as Sharon to suggest it almost suggests senility.

Sharon is however, to be commended for having the common sense to disregard the defunct Oslo Accords and its still-borne afterbirth, the 'Roadmap'. Yet, a unilateral withdrawal in the style of Gaza 1993 or Lebanon 2000 will lead to disaster. The idea of sealing off Gaza from Israel and even Israeli labor markets, and pouring foreign aid into the Strip does, however, have some merit. The policy requires no significant Israeli withdrawal, and certainly no evacuation of Jewish civilians. (It does however, require the recipients of the international aid to be accountable and transparent.)

In Israel's bitter experience, no-one - least of all Arab administrations - is better qualified, nor more highly motivated than the Israeli army to provide security for Israelis.

By withdrawing from Gaza, Sharon would be handing a victory to the terrorists and guaranteeing a disastrous security and diplomatic situation for Israel. Given all we know about the likely effects of such a withdrawal, it is staggering as to why there has not been greater protest from all Israelis.

Views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.

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