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Alan Perlman is a resident of the community of Carmel in the Hebron Hills region and a technical writer. Perlman has a master's degree in social work.
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By Alan Perlman
June 4, 2004
The sudden upsurge in support for Prime Minister Sharon's Gaza withdrawal plan is just the latest example of Israel's adoration for its generals. Israel loves its generals. This is not surprising in a small, besieged country where the army plays such an important and respected role.
The mystique of the generals pays dividends in the political sphere, where generals are quickly propelled to the top. What would be utter lunacy for an ordinary citizen - join a political party and announce the next day your candidacy for some high political position - is the norm for generals. True, not every general in politics took the short cut to the top - Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon were long involved in their parties. But since Oslo, Generals Ehud Barak, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Yitzhak Mordechai, Matan Vilnai and Shaul Mofaz have launched political careers, some stellar and others not, but all characterized by an immediate rise to the upper echelons upon leaving army service.
Now this is not necessarily bad. Generals, after all, are patriots who have dedicated their lives to serving the country. And more than likely, they became generals because they demonstrated outstanding leadership and accomplishment, and a proven ability to make difficult decisions under pressure. All of these are desirable traits for national leadership. But success as a general is no guarantee of success as a national leader, and may in fact hinder success simply because the State is not the army. Army generals essentially have absolute power - they dictate and others follow. But statecraft requires the ability to secure consensus and build coalitions, a skill set that usually develops over time.
Still, even generals who succeed in the public sphere can make major mistakes, and unfortunately, Israelis tend to place greater faith in generals, and be less critical of them than they are of other leaders, especially for generals thought to be hardnosed about security. And this uncritical acceptance can be disastrous, as the Oslo accords prove.
General Yitzhak Rabin's military credentials were outstanding. A true patriot from his pre-State Palmach days, Rabin was Chief of Staff during the Six Day War, and later, Minister of Defense. Yet, as Prime Minister, he allowed himself to be led like a bull with a ring though its nose by Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin who engineered the Oslo accords behind his back. Rabin did not initially have much faith that the accords would be successful but was willing to give them a try in order to end this seemingly intractable conflict. One need only recall the look on Rabin's face at the White House signing ceremony when forced to shake Arafat's hand. As Jay Leno quipped, Rabin looked like someone in a gas station restroom who knew that to leave he had to touch the doorknob.
Rabin's rubber stamp for Oslo carried the day, and Israel accepted the accords with eyes wide shut. It accepted the arming of the PLO and gave it autonomous areas. When Jews were murdered, Rabin called them sacrifices for peace and made more concessions. For a long time, the Israeli public, which should have rejected the idea of murdered Jews as sacrifices for peace, went along. Ultimately, and unfortunately much too late, the Israeli public opened its eyes and realized that their beloved general had gotten them into a terrible mess. Rabin's popularity plummeted and remained low until his assassination skyrocketed his approval rating and bestowed upon him a kind of national sainthood.
As the Oslo mess deepened, Israel soon voted for General Ehud Barak, who promised to deliver the peace and the security promised by Oslo. Barak convinced the Palestinians that Israel had no red lines by offering them a state on 95% of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and promising away Jerusalem. In thanks, they launched the Oslo war, currently winding up its fourth year with no end in sight. Again too late, Israelis opened their eyes and sent Ehud Barak packing.
Now our current Prime Minister, General Ariel Sharon, who was elected on a platform of no unilateral concessions, is hawking his unilateral disengagement plan, and the common wisdom is that the vast majority of the country supports the plan.
It is clear why the Left, including those who voted for Labor and General Amram Mitzna in the last election, would favor unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. For them, it is the first step toward withdrawal from all of the "accursed" territories. Less clear and more curious is why many who supported Likud and Ariel Sharon have done an about face and now favor unilateral withdrawal.
One can argue, and I have read and heard variations of this argument several times, that voters in the last election rejected the Labor party and its leadership, but not its platform. That is, they wanted Labor's platform of unilateral separation, but they rejected Labor's lack of red lines and its blind, starry-eyed approach to Israel's enemies. Caught in a war beyond Labor's ability to handle, the Israeli public voted for the strong, realistic leader who would fight the enemy head-on. This argument, however, blends likely truth with baseless assertion, especially as regards Gaza.
Though likely true that many voters specifically wanted Sharon (and not necessarily Likud) because they trusted his toughness and pragmatism, the suggestion that these voters favored the Labor's platform, including unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, is sheer nonsense. Consider for example that last October, when Sharon still opposed uprooting any settlers in Gaza, Yosef Paritzsky of Shinui suggested at a cabinet meeting that Israel replace civilians with soldiers in one Gaza settlement (Netzarim). Sharon immediately slapped Paritzky down, yet the country remained silent. There were no mass "Retreat From Gaza" demonstrations. There were no claims that the majority of the country favored unilateral withdrawal. The country knew full well that unilateral withdrawal from Gaza would vindicate the enemy's strategy of terror, and inspire them to continue.
So when did this segment of the country do its about face? About half a year later, when Sharon reversed his position and promoted the idea. The sudden upsurge in support for the Gaza withdrawal plan is merely the latest example Israelis idolizing and blindly following their generals with eyes wide shut (as they did with Oslo), this time joining up with those who would remove Israel from all of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
Now you might think that this time is different and that we should follow the general. After all, Sharon is no starry-eyed fool. He is a great strategist and tactician who out maneuvered Arafat and is winning the Oslo war. But consider: If Ariel Sharon is such a great strategist and tactician, how did he totally misread his own Likud party and suffer such an overwhelming defeat? Furthermore, when Sharon ignores the fact that not only his party but also his cabinet opposes his plan, and he threatens to replace opposing cabinet ministers with "yes men" because "he is right," it is clear that General Sharon, not Prime Minister Sharon, is making the decisions.
The Israeli turnaround on Gaza withdrawal, in synch with Sharon's turnaround, suggests that much of Israel still lets its awe of the generals trump its own instinct and common sense. As a result, Israel unfortunately seems headed for a self-inflicted, repeat performance of Oslo.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
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