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Doron Kescher , originally from Emek Hefer, is currently based in the Asia-Pacific region, working for a corporate advisory firm. A fluent English and French speaker, he has spent much of his time since September 2000 explaining the current conflict to non-Jewish work colleagues.
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By Doron Kescher
March 7, 2005
The conventional wisdom in government circles is that the withdrawal (unilateral disengagement) from Lebanon in May 2000 is an example of a redeployment that went well. Government ministers (who railed against the withdrawal at the time as a sign of weakness that would bring untold misery in the future) now constantly cite the relative quiet on Israel's northern border as 'proof' of the withdrawal's merits.
But was the Lebanon withdrawal good?
It is undoubtedly good that 25 of our boys are not dying in Lebanon every year. On this point, there is little debate.
However, many analysts postulate that the Oslo War was launched by Yasser Arafat and his cronies in part as a result of the apparent weakness shown by Israel in hastily leaving Lebanon under fire. Hizbullah was able to paint the picture -- with no small degree of truth -- that the constant bloodletting in south Lebanon was sapping Israel's resolve to fight: sure, the Israeli army could obliterate southern Lebanon, they said, but the Jews don't have the stomach for the fight. Israel had constantly said that it would remain in south Lebanon until a responsible government could guarantee not only the security of Israel's northern border, but of the Lebanese residents of the security zone. In the end, Israel left with nothing -- the last soldier to leave simply closed the border fence and locked it. Hizbullah, so it seemed, was right.
Emboldened by the Hizbullah 'victory' in Lebanon, and perhaps believing in phrases such as "the Lebanonization of Gaza", Arafat launched a terror war to force a demoralized and harassed Israel to withdraw from Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank") with no conditions, as they had in Lebanon. To achieve this aim, Palestinian terrorist organizations (the Palestinian Authority and Fateh among them) launched a terrorist war the likes of which were unseen in human history: satanic attack after satanic attack was perpetrated against Israeli civilians. No act was deemed too ghastly: from the vivisection of unarmed men in a town square to the execution of mothers protecting their children, each attack was more abominable than the last. For the second time within living memory, the hand of Satan touched the Jewish people.
By the time Israel had crushed the terrorist movements and Palestinian "President" Yasser Arafat died, over 1,000 Israelis had died horribly, and thousands more were forever maimed and disabled. In statistical terms, the carnage was on a par with the War of Attrition or the Lebanon War, save for the fact that the casualties were mostly civilian.
Even though Israel won the Oslo War by fighting the terrorists to a standstill and eventually driving them underground, the nagging question remained: did 1,000 Israelis (equivalent to a 40 year occupation of south Lebanon) die because of the withdrawal from Lebanon? Did the hasty retreat of May 2000 embolden the Palestinian Arabs to kill Jews?
We will probably never know for sure, as the man who launched the war is now dead. It is conceivable that Yasser Arafat may have gone to war in any case, given that he had reached the limit of what Israel could reasonably offer him, and the Palestinian mantra had always been that it would take as much as was offered and then go to war for the rest.
Perhaps the greatest result of the Lebanon withdrawal however is a change in the strategic balance between Syria and pre-nuclear Iran vis-à-vis Israel. With the strategic buffer of the south Lebanese security zone gone, Hizbullah has deployed its forces right along the border with Israel, and has amassed over 10,000 rockets aimed at Israeli cities and towns .
Hizbullah, while having its own radical Islamist agenda, is effectively a proxy army for Syria and Iran. The 10,000 rockets on the border have effectively hamstrung Israel's options with regard to both Syria and Iran, as any major action by Israel could trigger massive retaliation by Hizbullah against the civilians of northern Israel. Within minutes, major cities such as Haifa, Tsfat and Tiberias could be bombarded, along with Israel's vital economic infrastructure at Haifa Bay.
The guillotine blade hanging over Israel's neck has very cleverly allowed Iran to nuclearize at break-neck speed, largely free of the threat of Israeli pre-emptive action.
In one fell swoop, the withdrawal from Lebanon has encouraged violence against Israel, undermined its military deterrent and hamstrung its strategic options against Syria and Iran.
For these reasons, when government ministers cite Lebanon as an example of a 'good withdrawal', people start to worry.
So, would disengagement from Gaza be good? Let us leave aside for the moment the 'settlements' of Gaza, the thousands of beleaguered souls uprooted and evicted from their homes, and focus purely on the cold hard facts.
By leaving Gaza, for the second time in five years Israel would be -- whether in fact or in perception -- vacating territory under fire, with no agreement or tangible gains. The message to terrorists is clear: making Israel bleed has tangible benefits. "Hizbullah did it. Hamas did it. You can do it too".
By withdrawing from Gaza to the 1949-1967 borders, Israel would be giving undue importance to these arbitrary lines. The 1949 armistice lines represent nothing more than the limit of the Arab armies' ability to ethnically cleanse Israel of Jews in 1948. If Israel is to withdraw from Gaza, it should at a minimum retain those areas which are vital to Israel's security without regard to whether they are pre- or post-1967 Israel (areas such as the Katif block, the border area with Egypt and the hills near Nitzanit). Anything less effectively sanctifies the 1949 "Auschwitz borders" and sets a precedent for withdrawal in Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank").
The Sharon government is also banking on the notion that if Israel leaves Gaza in its entirety, it will gain leverage with the Palestinian Arabs and Europeans in the difficult negotiations on final borders in Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank"). There is nothing to suggest that this belief is true. The Arabs and Europeans have consistently stated that in their view, the Gaza withdrawal is but a first step on the road that will lead to a Judenrein ("Jew-free") Palestinian Arab state in all of Judea, Samaria, Gaza and "East" Jerusalem. Leaving Gaza will not allow Israel leverage or assuage the calls from Araby and Europe that every square meter of territory liberated in 1967 be given to the Arabs.
The withdrawal from Gaza is also a military risk. Several current and former top figures in the Israeli army have spoken against the unilateral disengagement, arguing that it will undermine Israel's security. The withdrawal from Gaza would open the flood gates for terrorist materiel through the already porous Sinai-Gaza border. Coupled with the fact that major population centers and economically sensitive installations in Ashkelon and Ashdod would be within artillery and rocket range, Israel would both endanger its population and simultaneously erode its ability to defend it. Three times in recent history (1956, 1967 and 2001) Israel has been forced to capture Gaza, at great cost in lives. Having a military presence at key locations within the Gaza Strip is absolutely vital to Israel's security, and one wonders how long after the disengagement our boys will have to fight their way back in again .
Government ministers constantly hope that the Gaza withdrawal will be "like the Lebanon withdrawal".
I hope not. I hope terrorists will not menace the border communities in southern Israel. I hope that we do not have another guillotine blade over our necks in the form of a trigger happy al-Qaeda- or Iranian-backed Hamas commanding an arsenal of 10,000 rockets (or worse) aimed at Ashdod, Ashkelon, Sderot and Beer Sheva. I hope the threat of artillery barrages will not hamstring our ability to protect our vulnerable citizens. I hope that the Arab world does not interpret the Gaza withdrawal as another sign that killing Jews gets results.
When all is said and done, we may have to relinquish the beautiful towns of Katif and northern Gaza as part of a comprehensive conflict-ending deal. But we do not have to surrender our vital security assets, and we certainly do not have to do it now, in the absence of an agreement.
The Gaza withdrawal is a mistake.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
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