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David Dreilinger and IPF Staff is a not-for-profit, nonpartisan organization with a singular purpose: to support active and sustained American efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
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By David Dreilinger and IPF Staff
September 28, 2005
This past weekend, the military chaos in the Gaza Strip seemed to mirror the political disarray and confusion within Israel's ruling party, the Likud. But, at the last minute, the Likud party righted its ship, rejecting the idea of early primaries for the party leadership that would have deposed its popular prime minister, Ariel Sharon, and split the party in two. It remains to be seen if President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority can put their house in order.
Last week Hamas fired dozens of rockets at Sderot, an Israeli town a few miles from the Gaza Strip. This followed an accidental explosion at a rally in Gaza that killed at least 15 Palestinians, which was followed by the brutal kidnapping, torture, and murder of an Israeli civilian from Jerusalem.
This increase in violence in no way invalidates disengagement. As Israeli analyst Yossi Alpher explains, "Sharon can now claim that Israel is much better positioned to fight terrorism in Gaza. There are no settlers there to be 'held hostage' by Palestinian terrorists, the PA's obligations to prevent terror are more clear-cut, and Israel can deal with terrorism from Gaza and address the PA's security failings there without the constraints of operating in occupied territory."
Still, these events hardly reassure Israelis watching Gaza and envisioning the future Palestinian state. Abbas' government, in which Israelis invested so much hope, has not yet delivered on security. The PA security services appear weak and divided, unable to confront Hamas even if they had the will. That is why the Israeli government launched a large-scale retaliation against Hamas in Gaza.
But, before the situation devolved even further into chaos, Hamas announced that it would suspend its rocket attacks on Israel (using the word hudna, or ceasefire, rather than tahdiya, which merely refers to "calm"). Islamic Jihad followed with a similar announcement shortly thereafter. The military pressure from Israel surely was the main factor in these decisions. But it was not the only one.
Hamas can't ignore public opinion. As pollster Khalil Shikaki revealed last week, 62% of Palestinians do not support attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip, while 60% believe that guns and weapons should be collected from the terrorist groups. Disengagement has obviously caused Palestinian priorities to change. Support for terrorism is dropping as Palestinians see an opportunity to improve their political and economic fortunes.
Hamas ignored this fact when it launched Kassam rockets at Sderot, and paid a political price. Not only did Israel respond with overwhelming force, but average Palestinians, together with Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, brought the pressure that caused them to back down.
Palestinian affairs correspondent Roni Shaked reported the scene in Yediot Ahronoth Wednesday: "The residents of the towns in the northern Gaza Strip brought to bear heavy pressure on the terror organizations to halt the fire. The residents' committee of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya -- which were bombed in the past three days -- issued leaflets yesterday calling upon the armed organizations to cease the Kassam rocket fire from their territory. Public pressure was also applied by the [Palestinian] street in Gaza, which only two weeks ago celebrated the Israeli pullout...."
A movement that aspires to acquire political power through elections cannot afford to perpetrate terrorism at a time when the public prefers negotiations.
Abbas' Responsibility
But there will likely be no negotiations while violence persists, which is why Abbas should exploit the shift in public opinion and confront the terrorists.
Abbas knows that the status quo is untenable, but plans to co-opt the militant groups into the political process rather than confront them directly. Over time, Abbas hopes, most members of groups like Hamas will grow enamored of legitimate political power, which would precipitate a split between those favoring violence and those advocating politics. The factions who wish to revert to terrorism would be marginalized, Abbas predicts, and easy fodder for a strengthened security apparatus.
Could Abbas' strategy work? It very well might. But it would be a long process, and wouldn't yield any dividends in the near future. And Abbas needs to halt the lawlessness in Gaza now.
The United States, Israel, the EU, and the Egyptians are willing to help. General William Ward is on the ground helping reform the security services, to ensure that when an order is given, it is carried out. Egypt and the EU are willing to train Abbas' forces and instill a much-needed sense of professionalism. Coordination with the Israel Defense Forces, akin to the discussions that took place last summer in the run-up to disengagement, could help Palestinian officers in the field locate and arrest terrorists.
Of course, not even the IDF has been able to destroy Hamas -- or make much of a dent in it -- and no one is expecting a miracle from the PA security forces. But the United States and Israel are counting on Abbas to make a concerted, good-faith effort to put a halt to terrorism from Gaza. To this end, there are steps he could realistically take: Abbas could work to enforce the intra-Palestinian ceasefire by preventing attacks on Israel and punishing those who violate the truce, and his forces could do a better job maintaining security on the border with Egypt and keeping weapons off the street.
Helping Abbas Win
In a larger sense, Israeli gestures can reinforce Abbas' moves by proving to Palestinians that his moderate approach produces political gains. That is why the Roadmap peace plan demands simultaneous actions. As Abbas disarms the terrorist groups, Israel has committed to freezing settlements, removing illegal outposts, and easing humanitarian conditions in the West Bank. The actions are mutually reinforcing.
Today, a majority of Palestinians attribute Israel's withdrawal from Gaza to violence and terrorism. It is important that Palestinians attribute further progress -- like an improved economy and better living conditions -- to Abbas and negotiations.
Israel has no choice but to respond to terrorism from Gaza. But, as Ofer Shelah of Yediot Ahronoth has pointed out, the history of IDF attacks against Hamas only prove that ?Israel does not have the ability to influence Palestinian public opinion [with its army].... If Israel wants to fight Hamas, it must present the Palestinian public with an option of hope that stems from support for Abbas.?
Sharon has a new mandate from the Likud. Abbas has support from the international community and internal Palestinian public opinion. It's time for some movement.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
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