By Dr. Aaron Lerner
November 4, 2005
As Israel marks a decade since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin many political commentators are speculating just how different the situation would be today if Yigal Amir had never carried out his despicable crime.
It is hard to know just how different the Netanyahu Administration would have performed if Binyamin Netanyahu had trounced Rabin at the polls (the trend indicated by surveys prior to the murder) instead of just squeaked by Shimon Peres.
Would a victorious Netanyahu have simply walked away from Oslo?
Would a defeated Rabin have taken a lead role as head of the opposition or retire from political life?
All a matter of sheer speculation.
What we do know is that Rabin circa 1995 would be shocked to learn of the policies embraced by the Sharon Administration -- not to mention the even more radical policies embraced by the folks who claim to be carrying on his vision.
The positions of Rabin circa 1995 are not a matter of speculation. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made the crystal clear when he addressed the Knesset on October 5, 1995 -- a month before he was gunned down -- when he presented the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement for ratification. [translation of the entire address]
Among his key points:
* No Palestinian State: "We view the permanent solution in the framework of the State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority."
(In those days the "demographic problem" -- the threat that a Palestinian majority would ultimately vote in the Knesset -- was not considered an issue s Palestinian participation in autonomy elections was considered a sufficient expression of self determination. The "demographic problem" only took a prominent role in Israeli discourse when withdrawal supporters found that the Oslo experience made if difficult to argue that withdrawal would
improve security and thus turned to the "demographic problem" to justify withdrawal.)
* No return to '67 borders: "The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines."
* Control of Jordan Valley: "The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term."
* Gush Katif as model rather than something to be evacuated: "The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif."
* All settlements remain intact during interim period - no settlement freeze: "I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth."
* Control of border passages remain in Israeli hands (during interim period): "The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands."
Would a post 1995 Rabin have abandoned his positions just as so many others did?
Possibly.
But it is hardly a tribute to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to assert that he would have been no better than the rest of the Israeli politicians who, through a dangerous combination of hubris, blind faith that ultimately retreating to the 1967 lines will miraculously herald a utopian ear in which the Arabs abandon any interest in Jaffa, Haifa and the rest of Green Line Israel, and an almost dogmatic refusal to think more than a few weeks or months ahead, are plunging Israel down into a dangerous abyss.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
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