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M.J. Rosenberg is Director of Policy Analysis for , a long time Capitol Hill staffer and former editor of AIPAC's Near East Report.
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By M.J. Rosenberg
January 13, 2006
There is both good news and bad news from Gaza these days. The good news is that Israel is out of there. The bad news is pretty much everything else.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's withdrawal strategy has, at least so far, been vindicated. Gaza is a problem -- more like a catastrophe -- but it's not Israel's problem. When it becomes Israel's problem -- i.e. when terrorists launch rockets or missiles at Israel -- the army will do what it must to defend Israelis.
But there are no settlers living in Gaza to complicate the army's job. Nor are there Israeli soldiers unhappily and dangerously guarding them in the midst of the Wild West violence that is Gaza.
This is what Sharon's idea of unilateral separation was all about: not to remake Gaza but to get out of it. Remaking the place is up to the Palestinians.
So far, they have not exactly been making a go of it.
It is not easy getting a handle on the chaos in Gaza. Until now it seemed apparent that the violent troublemakers were from Hamas while the peace-supporting moderates were with the Palestinian Authority.
Not so much now. Hamas desperately wants the January 25th Palestinian elections to take place as scheduled so it is telling its forces to limit the violence for now. Pulling about 40% in the polls, its influence will increase if those numbers hold up in the actual voting. Keeping the lid on violence is its tactic designed to ensure that elections happen. What happens on January 26th, the day after elections, is anyone's guess.
Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah party is dreading elections as much as Hamas is looking forward to them. The PLO was founded in 1964 and only a few years later Fatah took control of the organization. That hold on power has gone unchallenged for nearly forty years.
Fatah's monopoly on power included the perks that went with it, most notably control of the funds that came from international donors. In one respect, Palestinian politics is much the same as politics anywhere. Those in power control the money, the patronage, and the jobs. Fatah does not want to give any of it up. It has not had to in the year since Arafat's demise.
But that will change if Hamas scores big later this month. And that is one of the reasons Gaza is especially explosive this month. Some Palestinians, and others, fear that if Hamas looks strong on Election Day, thugs associated with Fatah (the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigade, for instance) might actually try to shut the elections down through violence. Failing that, they could initiate a civil war to avert any transfer of power to Hamas.
This is not something President Abbas and his team want. But it has become increasingly obvious that they are not in control of the situation. The Hamas leadership can stop its forces from shooting off Kassam rockets with a single phone call. It is, after all, a terrorist group; it has no difficulties in enforcing its authority. The PA has no comparable ability (which is why some people think Israel might be better off negotiating with Hamas. It can deliver. Except for one thing: it does not want to).
It is easy to blame Abbas and the PA for its failures in the year since Arafat died. But they were not the only ones to drop the ball.
The Israelis did very little to strengthen Abbas. Other than calling Abbas a "partner" (in contrast to Arafat), the Sharon government did little more for him than it had done for his despised predecessor. There are a good half dozen actions Israel could have taken to help Abbas win support, starting with the release of political prisoners. It chose not to. The United States did come through with aid (although Congress did its best, as is its custom, to attach pointless and humiliating conditions which President Bush and the PA were forced to accept).
The one success of the past year (other than the unilateral Gaza withdrawal) was the agreement over the movement of people and goods between Gaza, Egypt and the West Bank. Former World Bank Chairman James Wolfensohn was instrumental in crafting an agreement, enlisting the critical support and active involvement of Secretary of State Rice and then getting all sides to accept it.
But a key provision providing for bus convoys that would, with strict Israeli monitoring by Israel, allow Palestinians to move between Gaza and the West Bank has been blocked by Israel.
This is no small thing. The inability of Palestinians to move from Gaza to the West Bank, and back, is one of the most onerous conditions imposed by the occupation. The Wolfensohn/Rice plan solved the problem and addressed all of Israel's security concerns. The buses were supposed to start moving on a regular basis on December 15. Almost a month later, they are still parked in garages.
No wonder Hamas is doing so well. Neither the PA, the Israelis nor the Americans have done much of anything to prevent its ascent.
No one knows if Hamas in power will be much different from Hamas, the "resistance movement." On the one hand, it has issued a relatively restrained platform. It reaffirms Hamas's commitment to a "fully sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital" and "armed resistance to end occupation" but does not call for Israel's destruction. Of course, unlike the PA, when Hamas talks about a Palestinian state, it is not limiting itself to the West Bank and Gaza.
On the other hand, the Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar told the New York Times yesterday that it has no intention of relinquishing its arms. Nor did he indicate any acceptance of Israel's right to exist. The one hopeful sign was his indication of a willingness to cease attacks on Israel if Israel stops assassinating Hamas leaders. "If not provoked" Hamas might continue the ceasefire. Might.
The fact is that it doesn't matter very much what Hamas says before the election. What matters is what it does after it.
Some observers choose to be optimistic about that, arguing that the responsibilities of power will tame Hamas. Others point to Iran, for instance, where twenty-five years in power has not made the "Iranian revolution" any less dedicated to extremism than it was at the start. And the new President is more irrational and dangerous than any of his predecessors.
Of course, Hamas is only one player in an Israeli-Palestinian scene that has seemed to become far more volatile in the first thirteen days of 2006.
The PA and Israel both have important roles to play. And then there is the United States. For all the talk of engagement, there has not been much of it. The Bush administration's one aggressive effort -- the Rice mission to rescue the Gaza entry and exit issues -- did result in an agreement. The problem is that the follow through was not there.
This is an administration that has demonstrated that it can make a positive contribution to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when it so chooses. It has the right policy (the "roadmap"), a President committed to the two-state solution, and an unusually expert Secretary of State. The question is merely one of will.
If not now, when?
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
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