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M.J. Rosenberg is Director of Policy Analysis for , a long time Capitol Hill staffer and former editor of AIPAC's Near East Report.
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By M.J. Rosenberg
January 20, 2006
According to comprehensive polls of the Palestinian and Israeli populations, the two peoples are moving closer on the key issues that have divided them in the past. If the polls translate into votes in the January 25 Palestinian election and the March 28 Israeli election, progress toward resolution of the conflict would seem to be inevitable.
Unfortunately, only the Israeli electorate appears likely to vote in accordance with the polls' findings. Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's Kadima party holds a commanding lead (he actually is running more strongly than Prime Minister Ariel Sharon did in earlier polls). And Olmert is running as a centrist, ready for compromise with the Palestinian Authority and for confrontation with the settlers in the illegal outposts and their fanatical brethren in Hebron. (These clowns are now not only attacking the IDF but calling for an ultra-Orthodox settler state called "Judea.") Former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, campaigning as the settlers' champion and opponent of the diplomatic process, is running very poorly.
It is on the Palestinian side where the attitudes reflected in the polls seem not to be translating into votes. Hamas continues to gain strength in the legislative elections (the Presidential election took place last year and President Mahmoud Abbas remains in the office no matter what the result this month) while Abbas' Fatah continues to lose it. It is even possible that Hamas will win the election, an eventuality that few would have considered a few months ago.
What's going on?
The Israeli situation is easier to assess. According to a poll conducted in December by the Harry S Truman Research Center at the Hebrew University 64 per cent of Israelis support the so-called Clinton parameters for a settlement.
The Clinton parameters, presented by President Bill Clinton to Israeli and Palestinian negotiators at the White House in December 2000 and at Israel Policy Forum a few days later include the following.
For the Palestinians:
- Control over a sovereign, contiguous, viable state (94-96% of the West Bank) recognized by the international community.
- Sovereignty over Al Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) in Jerusalem.
- Control over the Arab sections of Jerusalem, which would serve as the capital of a Palestinian state.
- A comprehensive settlement plan for refugees that offered them several options: return to the new state of Palestine; return to the state of Israel (with restrictions); resettlement in a third country; and/or compensation.
For the Israelis:
- The right for 80 percent of the West Bank settlers, most of whom live near the 1967 borders, to stay put.
- Security guarantees.
- Control over the Jewish sections of Jerusalem, which would be internationally recognized as the capital of Israel.
- Control over and access to Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, including sections of the Temple Mount.
As noted above, 64% of Israelis support those terms. It is therefore not surprising that Kadima is running so strongly in the pre-election polls. Israelis have given up on the idea of Greater Israel, and are resigned to a West Bank/Gaza Palestinian state and the dismantling of settlements. Barring some unforeseen event, they appear ready to vote accordingly.
A significant new poll of Palestinian attitudes points in the same direction. The poll, conducted by Palestinian pollster Dr. Khalil Shikaki for the United States Institute of Peace's Project on Arab-Israeli Futures, finds that "for the first time since the start of the peace process, a majority of Palestinians support a compromise settlement that is acceptable to a majority of Israelis."
According to the USIP-sponsored poll "a majority of Palestinians are willing to accept the two-state solution" by which "Palestinians recognize Israel 'as the state of the Jewish people' and Palestine [the West Bank and Gaza] 'as the state of the Palestinian people.' In June 2003, 52 percent supported and 46 percent opposed this formula, and by September 2005 support rose to 63 percent and opposition dropped to 35 percent."
The USIP poll goes behind the numbers to uncover the variables which affect the percentages of Palestinians supporting accommodation with Israel as opposed to violence. Tracking support for accommodation over the years, the poll finds that Palestinians shift toward moderation at times of hope and toward violence when they feel hopeless.
"The Netanyahu period witnessed serious deterioration in the peace process, with little implementation of existing agreements on Israeli redeployment of forces out of Palestinian territories. The opening in September 1996 of a tunnel along parts of the Western Wall of al-Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount), which was followed by several days of Palestinian-Israeli armed confrontations, heightened threat perceptions, raised questions about the value of diplomacy, and increased Palestinian support for violence."
"The failure of the Camp David summit and the eruption of the second intifada were followed by an increase in support for violence. This increase is correlated with greater threat perception on the part of Palestinians. The Israeli use of military force, including tanks, helicopter gun ships, and F-16 bombers, against Palestinians inside populated areas, the Israeli imposition of collective punishment measures (such as closures, checkpoints, and restrictions on movement), the continued buildup of Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, and the building of the separation barrier of concrete walls and barbed-wire fences inside the West Bank are examples of threats the Palestinians had to endure during the years of the second intifada. The anger generated by these measures led people to demand revenge and to support all types of violence against Israelis, including suicide attacks against civilians inside Israel," the USIP reports.
In other words, the idea that Palestinians can be beaten into submission is precisely wrong and not just morally. The more painful and onerous the occupation feels, the more Palestinians move toward support for terrorism and opposition to the kind of approach represented by Mahmoud Abbas and others like him.
The current high-levels of support for the two-state solution is primarily a product of the cease-fire and reduction in overall violence that has taken hold since the death of Yasir Arafat.
The only fly in this ointment is the strong possibility that Hamas will run strongly in next week's election. If Palestinians support accommodation with Israel, why would they vote for a party that doesn't?
The answer is that a vote for Hamas is not necessarily a vote for Hamas' stance on Israel. Virtually every observer of the Palestinian scene and the polls as well, show that Hamas' main appeal is its apparent incorruptibility. Most Palestinians view the Palestinian Authority (and the Fatah party which controls it) as hopeless corrupt, inefficient and dominated by cronyism. Arafat is gone but the kind of governance he represented is thriving. Mahmoud Abbas has simply not been able to clean house.
Hamas promises that it will. It plays down its views on peacemaking.
Today's Economist writes: "What makes Hamas's appeal so great is that it does not just rest on its past performance -- social programs, leading the intifada's violence against Israel, and a reputation for honesty-- but on a canny, forward-looking campaign. It stresses domestic issues: education, welfare, law and order. The thornier questions of whether to continue its lull in attacks on Israel, declared last year, and what stance it might take on possible peace talks, are in the background."
It will be important to bear this point in mind as the votes come in next week. A Hamas triumph would be a sow's ear, one that only the truly naïve would even try to call a silk purse.
But it may not mean that Palestinians are giving up on the two-state idea. The Shikaki poll shows that the very opposite is the case which means that Hamas will have no mandate to reignite the intifada.
We may not like the results of the Palestinian election but if they are designated "free and fair" by the US National Democratic Institute and the other international observers, we will have to figure out some way to come to terms with them.
And here's the good news. A Hamas in power will itself have to come to terms with a Palestinian populace that supports its social programs and lack of corruption but opposes its stance on Israel.
That is why the diplomatic process will survive next Wednesday's Palestinian election (and certainly Israel's on March 28). Public opinion matters in democracies which is why a democratic Palestinian election is a step in the right direction even if we don't like the guys who win.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
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