 |
David Dreilinger and IPF Staff is a not-for-profit, nonpartisan organization with a singular purpose: to support active and sustained American efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
|
|
|
|
By David Dreilinger and IPF Staff
February 1, 2006
It was only last Tuesday that Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert -- the heavy favorite to win Israel's March 28th election -- declared his willingness to sit with the Palestinian government and negotiate, provided they disarmed the terrorist militias. If this condition was not met, Olmert said, he would do whatever was necessary to move the process forward: "We would prefer an agreement. [But] if our expected partners in the negotiations? do not uphold their commitments, we will preserve the Israeli interest in every way," he said. According to most analysts, the phrase "in every way" should be interpreted as a reference to another unilateral withdrawal.
Enormous changes have taken place since Olmert gave that speech. Hamas, whose militias Olmert wanted dismantled by the Palestinian Authority, now controls the Palestinian legislature. There is virtually no chance that Hamas will soon disarm itself, recognize Israel, and become a legitimate partner for negotiations. Olmert, for his part, has now declared the Palestinian government "irrelevant" and has forbidden contacts with Hamas. For that reason, as far as many Israelis are concerned, the "unilateral option" is the only active alternative that remains on the table.
This situation might sound familiar. In December of 2001, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon put the "irrelevant" label on Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority. Because Arafat was unable or unwilling to crack down on the terrorists, Sharon did not consider him -- or his government -- a partner for peace.
But, as Sharon quickly learned, simply ignoring the "irrelevant" PA didn't make Israel any safer. In fact, it was during this period that Israel absorbed the worst terrorist atrocities of the second Intifada. That's why, two years later, Sharon decided Israel had to alter the dangerous and counter-productive status quo, partner or not. His solution? Unilateral disengagement. "We will not wait forever for them," Sharon said back then.
For a growing number of Israeli leaders, that logic still applies, perhaps even more convincingly now than in 2003. For Israel, the status quo in the West Bank is unsustainable, and today's Palestinian Authority -- led by a Hamas that is unwilling to meet the international community's demands to renounce violence and recognize Israel -- appears to be even less of a potential negotiating partner than it was under Arafat. To leaders like Amir Peretz in the Labor Party, Uzi Dayan in the new centrist Tafnit movement, and Shaul Mofaz in Kadima -- in addition to Olmert -- unilateral disengagement is looking like an attractive option.
Waiting for Hamas to Moderate
The diplomatic process is not dead, but it certainly has been put on hold. Olmert knows that Israel cannot count on Hamas to moderate, even though there are tentative signs that that process might already be in motion. Pressure on Hamas from the international community to renounce violence and recognize Israel continues to grow, while at the same time some of the group's internal contradictions and disagreements are becoming more pronounced. Crucial budgetary aid from the United States and Europe is in jeopardy, and even the Arab League has called for Hamas to recognize Israel. At the same time, dueling policy statements regarding negotiations and dealings with Israel have emanated from the leadership in Syria and leaders in the West Bank and Gaza, and no one knows how much longer party discipline and unity will hold up.
What's more, it doesn't seem as if Hamas knows what to make of its mandate. Though it won far more seats than expected, the group's leaders realize that the majority of Palestinians in the territories do not fully buy into their Islamist social agenda or their call for the destruction of Israel. The people elected Hamas mostly because the ruling Fatah party was corrupt and ineffective -- Palestinians had not seen any improvements in their daily life, were weary of lawlessness and cronyism, and saw too little progress towards ending the occupation -- and they were looking for a change.
As a result, it seems clear that if Hamas wants to survive and govern effectively it will have to make some ideological and political compromises. But no one knows what the timetable for those compromises is. A full transformation to a legitimate political party -- if it happens at all -- will almost certainly take many months, even years.
Working Without a Partner
In the short term, Israel does not have a partner for negotiations. But, despite the suggestions of some on the extreme right, this new reality doesn't make Israel safer. It is true that Israel will have an easier time responding to terrorism simply because the Hamas takeover of the Palestinian government clarifies who and what should be the targets of Israeli reprisals. Israel no longer need worry that its military responses to terrorism will weaken the more moderate Fatah and strengthen Hamas, since Hamas holds both power and the responsibility for how it is exercised.
But the ascendance of Hamas in no way alters the essential fact that Israel's retention of settlements and territory in the West Bank endangers its future as a Jewish and democratic state. As Uzi Benziman wrote in Haaretz, despite the results of the Palestinian poll "putting an end to the occupation is still the order of the day."
That's why some people are focusing on the parallels between today's situation and the circumstances that led to Israel's first unilateral withdrawal. According to those who advocate further unilateral moves, the election of Hamas gives Israel an opportunity to set the political agenda, while at the same time giving the Palestinians time to sort out their political predicament. Analyst Yossi Alpher has suggested that if all else fails, Israel should expedite the construction of the security barrier and withdraw from parts of the West Bank in order to "shorten our lines of defense against terrorism and reduce the poisonous effects of occupation." According to a report in Haaretz, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has said that Hamas' victory gives Israel an "incentive" to make further unilateral withdrawals in the West Bank.
According to this logic, if, after a potential second disengagement, Hamas chooses to become a legitimate political party and binds itself to previously signed agreements with Israel, then the Israeli initiative will have energized the new political process. If it chooses to remain a terrorist group, Israel will find itself in a better strategic position to defend itself.
Some Israelis -- mostly those who remain committed to the idea of "Greater Israel" -- argue that unilateral withdrawals are nothing more than one-sided concessions that only embolden the enemy. Some, like Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu, draw a direct line from Israel's disengagement from Gaza to Hamas's electoral victory. While the situation is complex and cannot be summed up in a simple soundbite -- Israel, for instance, refused to negotiate the terms of the withdrawal with Abbas, leaving Hamas the only party to claim responsibility for Israel's exit -- unilateral withdrawals do have the potential to contribute to instability in the Palestinian territories. But in the absence of a negotiating partner, the alternative -- tightening an indefinite occupation that threatens Israel's demographic and strategic future -- is far worse.
In some ways, Hamas's victory has upped the stakes for Israel's next Prime Minister, while at the same time providing an opportunity. It could force Israel's next leader to take the first steps toward determining what Israel's eastern border will look like.
When faced with a similar situation in 2003, Ariel Sharon made the courageous decision to act on his own and evacuate the settlements from the Gaza Strip and a small part of the northern West Bank. It won't be a surprise if Olmert, who is both Sharon's protege and one of the architects of the unilateral strategy, follows in his predecessor's footsteps.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
|
|
|
|
Click on the blue headline to read a Talkback comment and respond to it. Click on the  icon to send a private email to the talkback writer. The icon appears only if the writer has decided to be contacted. If no popup window appears, please make sure your popup blocker allows israelinsider.com.
|
|
| |
|
|
