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David Dreilinger and IPF Staff is a not-for-profit, nonpartisan organization with a singular purpose: to support active and sustained American efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
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By David Dreilinger and IPF Staff
March 24, 2006
It has been nearly two months since Hamas's victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, and the Islamist group is likely put the finishing touches on its government and cabinet in the coming days.
In these two months, Hamas has not significantly altered its uncompromising political positions: it has not renounced violence, it has not recognized Israel, and it has not agreed to comply with all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.
But, for some in Israel, Hamas's election is no longer perceived with the same sense of foreboding that was felt on January 26, the day after the election. In fact, some are coming to see Hamas's takeover of the PA as an opportunity for Israel to transform the nature of the conflict. That is because, at this point in time, there is no one for Israel to talk to on the other side and accordingly it can take steps to withdraw settlements and end the occupation on its own terms.
Haaretz columnist Aluf Benn summed up this line of thinking a few weeks ago in an article called "Seize the Opportunity": "This is [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert's opportunity to shake off old ways. Instead of pleading with [Palestinian Prime Minister-designate] Ismail Haniyeh to accept Oslo, Hamas's victory can be exploited to impose the two-state solution."
This would mean a clean break from the Palestinians, cleaner than the separation last summer's disengagement from Gaza produced.
"The Palestinians want freedom?" Benn asked rhetorically. Okay. "Israel will announce that within a year it is giving up all responsibility for Gaza. No workers, no taxes, no electricity, no water. Let the Palestinians organize themselves to receive those services from Egypt, build a seaport and airport, and take the risk of a harsh reaction if the terror continues. In the West Bank, Israel will withdraw to the fence, and announce its readiness to negotiate any remaining border disputes."
Right now Israelis and Palestinians are locked into a conflict that is based on the entangled issues of sovereignty and occupation. If, as Benn suggests, Israel takes advantage of Hamas's victory to divorce itself from the Palestinian population by withdrawing to the security barrier line, the territorial aspect of the conflict will morph into a more traditional border dispute between two governments.
Not only would such a conflict presumably be easier to solve (for instance, a recent poll shows that 63% of Israelis are willing to compromise on East Jerusalem), but, from Israel's perspective, it would likely provide much-desired "time off" and international acceptance of Israel's position. It could then afford to wait for a moderate Palestinian government to emerge without feeling pressured to make compromises it is unready to make.
Of course there are potential problems. If, with Hamas at the head of the PA, there is a significant resurgence of terrorism it will be difficult for Israel -- politically and militarily -- to withdraw from most of the West Bank (Israelis would likely conclude that they would have to hold on to more territory, such as the Jordan Valley or other security zones from which the IDF would operate). Furthermore, it will be difficult for Israel to coordinate the logistics of withdrawal while Hamas leads the parliament and controls the government ministries. Israel would also be forced to rely on Egypt and Jordan to take on larger roles in Gaza and the West Bank, something their governments may not be eager to do.
But the biggest impediment to implementing what appears to be Olmert's "go-it-alone" strategy would be chaos and instability in the West Bank, and accelerating problems in Gaza.
With the change in government and the potential cutoff of international assistance to the Palestinian Authority, the situation is extremely delicate. There is a realistic chance that the PA, unable to manage widespread unemployment and poverty, could collapse, causing the Palestinian political system to fracture.
Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn warned against this possibility last month, saying that without money to pay salaries the PA would collapse within two weeks. Military and political power would be dispersed and decentralized, and, within the context of political, religious, and family rivalries it is almost certain that anti-Israel terrorism would return.
Israeli General Shlomo Brom (ret.) makes this point in a paper published by the United States Institute for Peace, cautioning that a collapsed PA is "likely to result in anarchy and chaos and possibly a resumption of full-scale violent conflict with Israel." Under these conditions, Israel would probably not risk withdrawing from the West Bank, even though it would end up responsible for maintaining order there.
With this in mind, the strategy of trying to "strangle" the Palestinians and to discredit the Hamas government by cutting off aid to the Palestinian people -- the set of ideas represented in Congress's post-Hamas election legislative proposals -- is beginning to look less attractive.
Not only is the approach politically suspect -- pressure on Hamas from the outside, especially from the United States and Israel, is likely to improve Hamas's standing rather than lead to the Islamist group's de-legitimization -- but it would limit Israel's diplomatic options as well. The security demands of a fractured and chaotic West Bank would spell the end of Israeli efforts to free itself from that territory.
Unilateralism cannot succeed if the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank are languishing in poverty and facing growing anarchy. On the contrary, Palestinian violence and lawlessness might make it impossible for Israel to extricate itself. Israel simply can't close the door when there is a ticking time bomb on the other side. That is why it appears that Hamas and the Israeli government have a common interest in securing the situation in the West Bank and Gaza and not exacerbating the difficulties that already exist. This explains why many Israelis are less than enthusiastic about the bills pending in Congress that would, if enacted, impose hardships on Palestinians across the board.
That means there is a need to find ways to get aid to the Palestinian people through private organizations and NGOs despite Hamas's presence in the government. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Wolfensohn told the committee "there is no way that we can? deal [with] Hamas. But what [is needed] is an alternative delivery mechanism which needs to be set up not utilizing Hamas leadership, and which meets the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians."
General Keith Dayton, the US Security Coordinator, has proposed "working with Palestinian civil society," while still others have suggested that it would be worthwhile for the international community to create social welfare programs parallel to the PA. The head of Labor's faction in the Knesset, Ephraim Sneh, has proposed using the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) -- which reports not to the Palestinian Authority but to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to the president, Mahmoud Abbas -- to grant assistance based on good management, accountability and full transparency.
None of these proposals will be easy to implement, but they aren't impossible, either. And, if Israel is to go through with its unilateral withdrawal from most of the West Bank, they might be necessary.
Polls show that Israelis are ready for a clean break from the Palestinians. But this won't happen if the Palestinian political system falls apart. Hamas needs to be isolated, but relations with the Palestinians must be balanced. It is important to make sure that while punishing Hamas, Israel's interests are not harmed as well.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
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