 |
Joel Bainerman has been thinking about Middle East political and economic subjects since 1983. His research studies and published archive can be viewed at www.joelbainerman.com.
|
|
|
|
By Joel Bainerman
October 17, 2006
In the early afternoon of July 12th, 2006, just hours after Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced at a press conference: "I want to make it clear: This morning's events were not a terrorist attack but the action of a sovereign state that attacked Israel for no reason and without provocation. The Lebanese government, of which Hezbollah is a member, is trying to undermine regional stability. Lebanon is responsible and Lebanon will bear the consequences of its actions."
How did the PM know -- hours after this event had taken place, that the Lebanese government was behind the attack? How did he verify in such a short time that the central government in Lebanon had a secret plan to "undermine regional stability?" Indeed, foreign reports indicated that the attack and kidnapping occurred in South Lebanon, not inside Israel.
Surely the Lebanese government would have no reason to kidnap Israeli soldiers. What Olmert was suggesting was that they in fact did -- and even though they didn't carry out the deed- just because it came from Lebanon's soil -- the Lebanese government was fully responsible and would, as he threatened, "pay the consequences."
Did Olmert he even take the time to ask Siniora personally if there was any Lebanese government involvement before he unleashed IAF attacks on targets in Beiurt and Lebanon's infrastructure?
The first objective of the war was not to destroy Hezbollah's offensive capabilities, but rather to destroy a large portion of the Lebanese national infrastructure.
Yet the threat Israel was emanating from the sites of the rocket launches in South Lebanon. Once the rocket attacks began -- the sole objective of the IDF should have been to end these attacks. Those rockets did not come from Beirut. Yet instead of destroying the real threats, Israeli jets destroyed a sizeable portion of Lebanon's civilian infrastructure in and around Lebanon's capital.
The central Lebanese government had not put the national infrastructure at Hezbollah's disposal. Other than more missiles and ammunition coming in from Syria -- there was no military threat that Hezbollah could not have exploited the use of Lebanon's infrastructure to attack the Israeli army and/or northern Israel. While Hezbollah's command center may have been situated in Beirut -- if the fighters in the field in the south of Lebanon were defeated, those command centers in Beirut would have posed no threat to the Israeli army or northern Israel.
So why then did the IAF target Lebanon's national infrastructure and the southern neighborhoods of Beirut and not focus its efforts strictly and solely on Hezbollah targets in S. Lebanon -- where the immediate threat to the Israeli population was coming from?
Another question: why did the Israeli government not order a massive blitz of Israeli troops, 20,000-30,000 fully equipped soldiers, to overwhelm the enemy? Instead of wasting bombs and manpower destroying Lebanon's national infrastructure and targets in Beirut, had Israel embarked on a massive ground invasion in the first days of the war the enemy would have been overwhelmed and defeated.
Yes, there would have been casualties -- though probably less than what the IDF ended up suffering -- but at least the victory would have ensured that Hezbollah was defeated, not merely relocated northwards, still armed. Israel would have enjoyed more world support as there would have been fewer Lebanese civilian casualties and less destruction.
A lighting blitz of tens of thousands of Israeli soldiers would have overwhelmed a few thousand fighters and produced a victory. So why didn't our Prime Minister and Chief of Staff take the only logical step which would have won the war, and quickly?
Case in point: the IDF tried to take over the border village Bint Jbail. For about a week it fought artillery battles with a local militia there but refused to bomb the villages where the resistance was coming from. As a result, no air bombings of any South Lebanese village took place.
Could Israeli military commanders really be so incompetent as not to be able to secure a small village held by a local militia? In fact, after more than four weeks of fighting, the rocket launchers in South Lebanon were still a major threat to Israel and only the ceasefire stopped these attacks. The Israeli army failed completely to even attain that most basic goal.
Could it really be that despite billions that Israel, with U.S. support, invests in its military -- the IDF is incapable of defeating a small, local militia armed with personal weapons, anti-tank missiles, and short range missiles? A militia with no engineering corps, no paratroopers, no fighter jets, no tanks. Could the Israeli army really be that bad?
Israel has one of the best -- if not the best -- fighting forces in the entire world. If allowed to do its job, the IDF would have easily finished off Hezbollah in a matter of days.
The answer can only be that Israel's government never intended to win. After all, the Lebanese government did not "declare war on Israel" as Olmert pronounced in his first reaction to the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers. It did not even support the Hezbollah actions. Olmert was looking for an excuse to initiate a conflict -- not to destroy Hezbollah -- but for reasons unknown to the public, because we do not know which agreements with the White House. After all, with a substantial portion of Israel's defense budget coming from Washington, "he who pays the piper calls the tune.|
Was the goal of the campaign to provoke Hezbollah to "shoot its load" and diminish its capability prior to a planned attack on Hezbollah's patron, Iran? Was it to "invite" -- under conditions of weakness and duress -- a multinational "peacekeeping" force to serve as a prototype for future invitations to internationalize the conflict in Gaza, the West Bank and Jerusalem and buffer Israeli and Palestinian forces? Time will tell. Perhaps.
As difficult as it may be to admit that Israel's national leaders carried out agendas behind the backs of the Israeli public -- it may be more comforting to accept that ugly truth than to conclude that Israel's national defence forces no longer have any serious military capabilities. If the ultimate conclusion is that the IDF is no longer a competent military force -- then the Israeli public would have a much bigger problem on their hands than corrupt, dishonest national leaders.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
 
|
|
|
|
Click on the blue headline to read a Talkback comment and respond to it. Click on the  icon to send a private email to the talkback writer. The icon appears only if the writer has decided to be contacted. If no popup window appears, please make sure your popup blocker allows israelinsider.com.
|
|
| |
|
|
